

Brig. Gen. J. D. Hittle: Tide in Vietnam Is Turning in Our Favor

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. L. MENDEL RIVERS

OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, June 3, 1963

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina, Mr. Speaker, a distinguished, courageous Marine Corps veteran has provided at my request a first-hand report of the bitter war in South Vietnam.

Brig. Gen. J. D. Hittle, U. S. Marine Corps, retired, declares that the United States can beat the Communist if we do not falter in this desperate struggle for control of Victnem—considered by many to be a key country in the control of southeast Asia.

Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks to the Appendix of the RECORD, I hereby insert his report for the information of the Congress

Hon. L. MENDEL RIVERS,

Chairman, Subcommittee No. 1, Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.O.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your request that I provide you with a few of my observations of the situation in South vietnam. These observations, as you will recall, are based upon my recent visit to South Victnam, in company with Mr. Joseph Lombardo, Schlor Vice Commander-in-Chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States. On the basis of my observations both in Saigon and in the outer country area, and as a result of my conversations with United States and South Vietnameso military personnel and civilians, it is my firm impression that the tide has begun to turn in our favor in this bitter war in South Vietnam. If the United States does not falter in the stretch, we can win this struggle, and it is a struggle which we cannot, from the standpoint of sheer national security, afford to lose.

It is evident that the tremendous effort over the past couple of years by the United States and by the South Vietnamese Government of President Diem has reached the

point where these force favorable results.

The basic indicators as to the frend of evenits are favorable to our efforts. These indicators include the trend in total areas controlled by the Communists and the South Vietnamese forces; the trend in defections from the Communists to the South Vietnamese; the casualty ratios between the Communists and the South Vietnamese and the progress being so demonstrative activative. the progress being so demonstrably achieved in President Diem's strategic hamlet strategy.

The strategic hamlet strategy is basic to the entire war in South Vietnam. It in-volves, as I know you are aware, the concentration of the populace in fortified and de-fended villages. This has a twofold effect: fended villages.

First, the protection of the people from Communist terrorism; and second, the depriving of the Communists of sources of food supply, arms, and personnel for impressment into their military and supporting forces.

In the course of our visit in South Viet-nam. Mr. Lombardo and I visited several strategic hamlets. These, I would like to point out, were not in the Salgon area where the most immediate results might be expected but rather in the forested high plateau country. The strategic hamlet program I was reliably informed, has progressed in a most satisfactory manner and in some areas is almost 90 percent completed. This represents a most significant achievement on the part of President Diem's government.

I might mention also that one of the most significant and potentially decisive develop-ments in South Vietnam has been the relatively recent swing of the Montagnard tribes to the pro-U.S. government of President Diem. The Montagnard's are an aborigine probably Malay—derivation people, totaling between probably 400,000 or 600,000, in-habiting the high plateau forest area, along the Laotian and Cambodian borders of South Vietnam.

These Montagnards have been woord b the Reds with promises and inducement because of their importance in the ultimat outcome of this struggle. However, the Montagnards are giving their support to the Diem government in increasingly large num There are two reasons for this: The terrorist tactics of the Reds have boomeranged; and the farsighted sound policies of President Diem's government, with U.S. advice and assistance, are gaining the con-fidence and allegiance of the Montagnards.

These tribesmen are intimately acquainted with Red infiltration routes along the Laotian and Cambodian borders. They are They are natural guerrilla fighters. Although many of them have hunted only with a cross bow they respond quickly, as was evident during our visit to a Montagnard training base, to modern weapons and military organization, Their support of the anti-Communist government of President Diem constitutes a genuinely serious setback for the Reds.

One of the most interesting but not surprising aspects of what is going on in South Vietnam is the truly magnificent service be-ing performed by the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force personnel in that area.

I was particularly impressed by the enthusiasm, tireless efforts, and high level of professional competence of the military advisory team No. 33 which we visited in Bia Me Thuot. This is an area of the primith's Montaguards tribes, and one in which the querrilla warfare is bitter. To U.S millbury personnel, who are living under austice. standards, have gained the confidence of both the South Vietnamese regulars and the Montagnards. For instance, one of the U.S. Altay advisers working with Montinguard: lust constructed a bamboo waterwhee, at the specif, but very important local agricultur, i rebeol. As rudimentary as this bulgire this rwheel is, it is a completely new strains to the Montagnards, who marvel at the at

to lift water a few feet from a small stream nd irrigate the vegetable gardens and in a succession of the part of the U.S. personnel is test of the contributions which our forces making both in specific military matters all of my conversations in Vietnam ersonnel of various ranks, I did not thy complaints or griping as to the type complaints or griping as to the type great the first that the first th from South Vietnam.

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the trends of the conflict, I be-A table to conclude that if we seemined effort in South Victorian unlat aggression in that the seem of some assistance to

J. D. HITTLE.